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5 February 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

[Redacted box]

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*South Vietnam: [Military concern over an imminent power bid by General Khanh appears to have diminished.]

[General Dong, one of those generals who earlier anticipated that Khanh would seek to have himself elected chief of state at today's meeting of the Armed Forces Council, now feels that no immediate crisis is likely. Dong now expects discussions to focus on the composition of the projected military-civilian council, toward which considerable progress was made yesterday in talks with civilian representatives.]

[Several other generals have indicated doubts that Khanh would at this time risk provoking the strong military and civilian reaction which they claim he knows would result from a bid for overt political power.]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] A junior officer plot was exposed last night and two captains are under arrest. They are reportedly being questioned as to possible ties with chronic plotter Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao.]

[The Buddhists meanwhile remain quiescent, but there are increasing rumors that they may resume agitation to bring former premier Huong and various security officials to trial for alleged anti-Buddhist crimes.]

*France: De Gaulle's 4 February press conference was a major effort to reinforce France's claim to full recognition as a world power.

By implicitly justifying his refusal to pay UN assessments for peacekeeping operations, De Gaulle stressed his view that General Assembly initiatives in the internal affairs of UN members are unconstitutional and emphasized the importance he places on big-power decision-making. His plea to return to the charter and to a "recovery of equilibrium" through a special convocation of the US, USSR, UK, France, and Communist China underlined his conviction that Peiping must be brought into world councils.

The call for a return to the gold standard and for supplementary international monetary reforms--moves which would reduce the key role of the dollar and pound in international financial settlements--reflects his growing concern that Europe assert its independence in all fields and free itself of American economic dominance.

De Gaulle stressed the importance of German reunification, thereby fulfilling a commitment to Erhard. He conceded nothing concrete to the Germans; however, still maintaining that progress must be based on an eventual detente between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc countries.

(continued)

By insisting that the first step toward such a development must be the political and military union of the six EEC countries, he made clear his view that Europe must free itself from dependence on the US in the defense sphere. The warning was implicit that any effort to revive the MLF or similar proposals would block all movement toward goals vital to Germany.

[REDACTED]

* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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USSR-UN: [The Soviets have indicated interest in a private US-Soviet understanding on a compromise solution to the question of Soviet arrears and Article 19.]

[In a talk with a US official on 3 February, a member of the Soviet delegation reiterated that Moscow will continue to insist on acceptance of the Afro-Asian plan of 30 December. This plan called for resumption of normal voting in the General Assembly, followed by unspecified voluntary contributions and non-application of Article 19.]

[The Soviet official indicated the possibility of some modification in the USSR's position that there should be no notification of the amount or timing of the Soviet contribution prior to a resumption of assembly voting. He said it might be possible for the US and the USSR to exchange such information privately prior to making simultaneous contributions. He indicated that he would consult with Soviet chief UN delegate Federenko and Moscow on this matter.]

[The USSR may calculate that any compromise settlement with the US would convert the arrears question into a contentious issue between the US and some of its Western allies also in arrears, such as France.]

[The US Mission believes that the fact Makeev sought the meeting expressly to discuss the Article 19 problem would appear to indicate that the Soviets are eager to settle, "but of course on their terms or as close to their terms as they can get."]



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Cuba: [The prospective public trial of an "old-line" Cuban Communist is not likely to be followed by any widespread purge of the "old guard."]

[Castro is said to have promised that "old-line" Communist Joaquin Ordoqui will be publicly tried for antiregime activities. Castro's "new" Communist supporters have advocated a revenge trial, while the Soviet ambassador in Cuba is reported to be exerting strong pressure against a public trial.]

[These conflicting pressures have probably caused Castro to consider the implications of a public show trial. There has been speculation that a trial would precipitate a wider move against the "old" Communists, but this is unlikely. Castro's position is not threatened by this group, and a drastic move against them might severely jolt relations with Moscow.]

[Ordoqui was publicly reproached by Castro at the trial of Marcos Rodriguez last March. In November he was suspended from his position as quartermaster of the armed forces and from his post on the Cuban party directorate.]


[the basic charge against Ordoqui is that he cooperated with Batista authorities against Castro. Cuba's "new" Communists have long castigated the "old" Communists for waiting until the eve of victory before supporting the Castro revolution.]

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LAOS



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NOTES

*Laos: Forces under General Kouprasith are continuing mop-up operations against rightist rebel troops in the Vientiane area. Kouprasith's troops yesterday were reported moving north from Vientiane toward the Phou Khao Khouai headquarters of General Siho, whose police units had been driven out of the capital on 3 February. [T-28 aircraft of General Ma's small air force are also engaged in the clean-up operations, and on 4 February mounted several air strikes against fleeing dissident troops.] Meanwhile, the dissident leaders, Generals Phoumi and Siho, remain unlocated.


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Japan-- South Korea: The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shina to Seoul from 17 to 20 February should improve the atmosphere for settling long-pending economic and political issues between the two countries. The Japanese are aware that lack of popular support seriously handicaps the Pak government in making the concessions necessary for reaching an agreement. The Japanese visitors appear to be considering possible gestures which would demonstrate their good intentions and moderate Korean antipathy toward Japan.


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USSR: Soviet scientist Trofim Lysenko, whose theories on biology and agriculture have been backed by Stalin, Khrushchev, and perhaps by other top leaders, has been removed from one of his main strongholds as head of the Genetics Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Lysenko came under attack in the press almost immediately after Khrushchev's ouster. The attacks continued until mid-December but were cut off for a month, suggesting high-level dissension on how to handle the issue. There are some indications that the anti-Lysenko forces received Premier Kosygin's support.



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 4 February 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

SNIE 10-65, "Communist Military Capabilities
and Near-Term Intentions in Laos
and South Vietnam" [REDACTED]

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SNIE 53-65, "Short-Term Prospects in South
Vietnam" [REDACTED]

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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